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PERSONAL JURISDICTION AFTER GOODYEAR AND
MCINTYRE ONE STEP FORWARD; ONE STEP BACKWARD?
JAMES M. BROGAN*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The 2011 Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) created expectations of
a restrained approach to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
state and federal trial courts. The decisions seemed to be an
attempt to reign in state and federal district courts which were
trending to an expansive application of previous Supreme Court
decisions using confusing and expansive analyses to extend
personal jurisdiction over both non-U.S. affiliates of U.S. based
companies and non-U.S. based manufacturers. While neither
Goodyear nor McIntyre erased all concerns, they did raise hopes in
the world wide business community. These hopes have been
dashed by a number of inconsistent trial court and appellate
decisions which confound predictability and further complicate the
environment surveyed by businesses contemplating transactions or
expansion in the United States.
Issued the same day, the Supreme Court decisions in Goodyear
and McIntyre provided guidelines for manufacturers concerned
about the prospect of defending their products in United States
courts. The Supreme Court’s instruction in Goodyear concerning

* Managing Partner, Philadelphia, DLA Piper LLP (US). This essay begins
with a paper presented by me after the decisions in Goodyear and McIntyre to the
Defense Research Institute on April 13, 2012, which served as a basis for
discussion at a workshop and panel conducted the same day. In addition, I
discussed the paper at a workshop and panel conducted by the Product Liability
Advisory Council on October 7, 2011. I substantially revised and updated the
essay to reflect the efforts of courts interpreting Goodyear and McIntyre. As the
law evolves, I will continue to revise and update the essay and will likely publish
future versions and participate in workshops as interest requires. I wish to thank
Associates Matthew A. Goldberg and Michael E. Bushey, Jr. for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this essay and their tireless efforts on behalf of clients located
outside of the United States of America.
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the exercise of ‘general jurisdiction,’ an extension of jurisdiction
not dependent on the action arising from the supply of a product
to the forum state, set relatively solid, well defined boundaries.
The Supreme Court’s guidance in McIntyre, however, concerning
the exercise of ‘specific jurisdiction,’ an extension of jurisdiction
arising from a manufacturer’s product allegedly causing injury in
the forum state, consisted of a plurality and two other opinions.
While the sum of the parts justified conservative expectation
decisions, the lack of consistency across the parts provided an
excuse for some courts to continue an expansive application of the
previous Supreme Court decisions.
It is important to understand that from the perspective of a
business executive predictability is paramount. The fact that both
U.S. and non-U.S. based companies need to consider jurisdiction
from state to state, and not with respect to the United States as a
whole, complicates forecasting. Neither Goodyear nor McIntyre
touch upon claims arising from federal law or claims which
implicate a federal statute that authorizes nationwide service of
process.1
In those instances, a court may determine it is
appropriate to analyze the defendant’s jurisdictionally significant
contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than limiting the
analysis to the forum state. Similarly, neither case impacts the
jurisdictional analysis or theory used in a minority of states using
‘long-arm’ statutes that restrict a court’s ability to exercise power
over a foreign defendant to anything less than the fullest extent
permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment. Goodyear and McIntyre
did, however, raise the expectation that in tort cases, there might
be more uniformity in the exercise of jurisdiction by state and
federal courts.
In Goodyear, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the ‘streamof commerce’ test for general personal jurisdiction. In McIntyre,
four justices of the Supreme Court arguably took a previously
announced plurality requirement of ‘stream of commerce plus’ for
the exercise of jurisdiction to ‘stream of commerce, plus, plus,’
requiring the demonstration of a ‘manifest intent’ of the
manufacturer to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court.
1 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (“For a claim that arises under federal law, serving
a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a
defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state's courts of
general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United
States Constitution and laws.”).
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Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Kennedy expressly
rejected the view that a manufacturer is subject to a forum’s
jurisdiction simply because it placed its goods into the ‘stream of
commerce,’ knowing or having reason to know those goods will be
carried to the forum.2 Justice Kennedy emphasized that “the
stream-of-commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the
mandate of the Due Process Clause or the limits on judicial
authority that Clause ensures.”3 In other words, a “defendant’s
transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only
where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a
general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have
predicted that its goods will reach the forum State.”4
Unfortunately, while Justices Breyer and Alito concurred, they
chose to rely on existing precedent and the particular facts of
McIntyre. They offered that it was “unwise to announce a rule of
broad applicability without full consideration of the modern-day
consequences” and did not find such “relevant contemporary
commercial circumstances” were presented in the matter.5 They
determined the case could have been decided simply by “adhering
to . . . precedents” and that it did not present the opportunity to
issue “broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional
rules.”6
The current situations in two neighboring states, California and
Oregon, provide ample evidence of the lack of direction provided
by McIntyre. In Dow v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 4th 170 (2011),
the Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District, relying on
the majority’s decision in McIntyre, held that California courts
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign
manufacturer based on a stream of commerce analysis, where the
company did not directly ship, sell or advertise its products within
the state. In contrast, the Oregon Supreme Court determined it
was not bound by the decision but rather only the narrow holding
of the concurrence.
It then determined that a Taiwanese

J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011).
Id. at 2791; see also id. at 2785, 2788 (describing the limits of the stream-ofcommerce metaphor) .
4 Id. at 2788 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2789 (“[I]t is the defendant’s
actions, not his expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to
judgment.”).
5 Id. at 2791, 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 2792–93 (Breyer, J., concurring).
2
3
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component part manufacturer was subject to personal jurisdiction
in Oregon even though it had no direct contact with the state.7 The
Court determined that the volume of final product containing the
component sold in Oregon by another manufacturer during a twoyear period – over 1,100 units – established sufficient contacts in
the state for the Oregon court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the company.
Nevertheless, with the caution that the analysis is very much
factually dependent, the following paragraphs provide a summary
analysis and simplified list of criteria for evaluating a particular
entity’s risk of jurisdiction in general, risk of jurisdiction flowing
from a specific incident and, finally, the risk of jurisdiction as a
consequence of its dealings with affiliates, particularly subsidiaries.
2.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION GENERALLY

Personal jurisdiction is the “power of a court over the person of
a defendant in contrast to the jurisdiction of a court over a
defendant’s property[.]”8 Grounded in due process concerns
derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the determination of whether a court in the United
States can exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate
defendant focuses on whether that “defendant has certain
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.”9
A plaintiff will usually attempt to establish a defendant’s
‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state (i.e., the state in which
the litigation was brought and/or is pending) through a theory of
either general or specific jurisdiction. Plainly stated, general
jurisdiction exists if the foreign defendant conducts a “continuous
and systematic”10 part of its general business within the forum
state, while specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant has
purposely directed its activities at residents of the forum and the

Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 874-75 (2012).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (6th ed. 1990).
9 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853
(2011) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
10 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom.,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
7
8
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litigation results from alleged injuries that “aris[e] out of” or are
“related to” those activities.11
A plaintiff may also attempt to establish ‘minimum contacts’ by
asking the court to impute the jurisdictionally significant contacts
of another corporate entity to the foreign defendant. In the context
of the foreign-parent/U.S.-subsidiary relationship, the plaintiff will
ask the court to pierce the corporate veil between the two entities
and/or treat them as alter egos for purposes of determining
personal jurisdiction. Similarly, separate from a jurisdictional
question, a plaintiff may seek to pierce the corporate veil in the
forum in which a judgment is obtained or the forum in which the
parent resides once a judgment is obtained. A more detailed
discussion of these theories appears below, along with a brief
analysis of how each theory is implicated by alternate facts.
3.

GENERAL JURISDICTION

An exercise of general jurisdiction is proper when the
defendant’s “continuous corporate operations within a state [are]
so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities.”12
Though “the commission of certain ‘single or
occasional acts’ in a State may be sufficient to render a corporation
answerable in that State with respect to those acts,” such contacts
may not extend a court’s jurisdiction “to matters unrelated to the
forum connections.”13 In other words, the general jurisdiction
inquiry focuses on whether a foreign “corporate defendant’s instate contacts [are] sufficiently ‘continuous and systematic’ to
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to
those contacts.”14
As stated by one federal court of appeals, “a finding of general
jurisdiction permits a defendant to be haled into court in the forum
state to answer for any of its activities anywhere in the world.”15
Because of these implications, the standard for establishing the
kind of “continuous and systematic” contacts necessary for general

11
12
13
14
15

2004).

McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).
Id.
Id. at 2854 (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir.
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jurisdiction has been described as, among other things,
“exacting,”16 “fairly high,”17 and “difficult.”18 Although no precise
test exists, the defendant’s contacts with the forum must
“approximate physical presence.”19
Accordingly, a court
evaluating a theory of general jurisdiction will consider certain
facts including, but not limited to, whether the corporate
defendant:
Is incorporated in the forum state
Is licensed or authorized to do business in the forum state
Has a place of business in the forum state
Owns, rents, or leases real estate in the forum state
Has contracted with any party located in the forum state
Maintains an office in the forum state
Pays taxes in the forum state
Has a registered agent for service of process in the forum
state
Has consented to be sued in the forum state
Has a bank account(s) in the forum state
Has a sales force or employees in the forum state
Maintains its corporate records in the forum state
It is important to understand that these factors would only be
relevant to litigation commenced in the state in which the analysis
is made. For instance, an entity’s strong ties with Oregon are
irrelevant to a jurisdictional analysis by a court in Iowa. Likewise,
the fact that a manufacturer consented to jurisdiction in Indiana,
and/or has a place of business in Indiana, would be irrelevant to

Id.
Shea v. Bonutti Research, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-615, 2011 WL 53473, at *12 (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 7, 2011) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223
F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000)).
18 Shea, 2011 WL 53473 at *12 (quoting S. Sys., Inc. v. Torrid Oven, Ltd., 58
F.Supp. 2d 843, 848 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
19 Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at
1086).
16
17
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an analysis of personal jurisdiction if the manufacturer was sued in
New York.
4.

SPECIFIC JURISDICTION

Specific jurisdiction focuses on whether (1) the foreign
defendant “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of the privilege of doing
business in the forum state, and (2) the plaintiff’s claims arose from
or are related to those activities.20 In other words, to establish
specific jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show that the corporate
defendant purposefully directed its business activities at residents
of the forum state and that the litigation arises from injuries related
to those activities.21 When making this determination, the district
court examines the relationship among the forum, the defendant,
and the litigation.22 In product liability cases, plaintiffs often
attempt to establish specific jurisdiction based on a ‘stream of
commerce’ theory. The argument is that “placing goods into the
stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be
purchased by consumers within the forum State’ may indicate
purposeful availment.”23 This argument is topically attractive,
particularly in the case of a manufacturer in the business of making
thousands or even hundreds of thousands of products, which are
then shipped and sold all over the world. After all, why should
such a manufacturer ‘escape responsibility’ when it ‘knew or
should have known’ the product would eventually wind its way to
a consuming public in a prosperous country?
As described in the introduction, the boundaries of this theory
are still subject to debate. Though courts should not determine
jurisdiction simply because the product leaves the loading dock of
the manufacturer and ‘floats’ down a river, across an ocean and up

20 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854
(2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))
(explaining the origin and application of specific jurisdiction doctrine since
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)).
21 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985)
(illuminating the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement).
22 See Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat’l Assoc. v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d
Cir. 1992) (noting the importance of considering various relationships “in order to
determine whether ‘the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’”)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)).
23 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (quoting
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
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another river, the fact is that large numbers of product provide the
sort of temptation that some courts can’t resist.24 In King, the court
stated: “Here, GM Canada, the entity who built certain vehicles for
GM Corporation to distribute specifically in the United States,
including Alabama, cannot genuinely maintain that it does not
serve the Alabama market. Stated differently, if not Alabama,
what market does GM Canada serve?”25
The plurality in McIntyre would hold that it is not enough to
demonstrate an intent to serve the U.S. market generally. In the
plurality’s words, “it is the defendant’s actions, not his
expectations, that empower a State’s courts to subject him to
judgment.”26 To put it another way, the plurality would require
the proponent of jurisdiction to demonstrate more than “the
defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach the forum
State.”27 Even the more narrowly drawn concurring opinion
explicitly rejects the notion that “a producer is subject to
jurisdiction for a products-liability action so long as it ‘knows or
reasonably should know that its products are distributed through a
nationwide distribution system that might lead to those products
being sold in any of the fifty states.’”28 The failure of the court to
reach a strong consensus, or at least a majority, nevertheless made
it possible for courts to interpret the consequences of placing
products in the stream of commerce liberally.
Although the decisions are not consistent from state to state,
entities seeking to avoid the risk of jurisdiction need to account for
factors which might support a court’s decision to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a product manufacturer, seller, or distributor.
They include, but are not limited to, whether the corporate
defendant:
Sells its products directly to customers or consumers in the
forum state
Designs products specifically addressing the needs of
customers or consumers in the forum state

24 See Willemsen v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867 (2012).; see also King v. Gen.
Motors Corp., No. 5:11-CV-2269-AK, 2012 WL 1340066 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2012).
25 King, 2012 WL 1340066 at *8.
26 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
27 Id. at 2788.
28 Id. at 2793.
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Controls the distribution of products into the forum state
Has established or maintained channels for providing
advice regarding its products specifically for consumers in
the forum state’s market
Has conducted marketing efforts specifically directed to the
forum state market
Designs, manufactures, or tests its products in the forum
state
Has entered into any contracts with residents of the forum
state that are implicated by the litigation
For example, it is fairly easy to understand that where a
manufacturer makes substantial and expensive products outside
the United States and sells thousands of them directly to customers
located in a particular state, the manufacturer would find itself
‘hailed’ into court by a court in the state to which it sent products.
The analysis clouds where the products are shipped to one state
but end up being distributed to others. At one end of the
spectrum, it is less likely a court will extend jurisdiction where a
completely separate entity takes ownership of the product and
sells the product through its distribution channels to a retailer or
end user. At the other end of the spectrum, a court is likely to
extend jurisdiction where the manufacturer ships its products to a
subsidiary that has not purchased the products or contracted with
the retailer or end user, and then directs their delivery to retailers
and/or users in other states.
The risk of jurisdiction is not limited to mass producers. A
court is more likely to extend jurisdiction over a limited production
manufacturer that makes products ‘per order,’ particularly to meet
an exacting design required by a particular purchaser in the
proposed forum state. Another example is a situation where the
manufacturer assists a customer in designing the end product in
which its component is installed. While McIntyre involved limited
distribution (one product is indeed extremely limited) but strong
indications of McIntyre’s desire the product be sold in every state
in the United States, the fact that the Supreme Court did not
exercise jurisdiction was based more on the consideration of a lack
of ‘manifest intent’ that the product would end up in New Jersey
rather than the limited nature of the distribution.
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ALTER EGO/PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL

Neither Goodyear nor McIntyre addressed, and therefore did
not limit or expand existing case law, permitting a plaintiff to
establish jurisdiction over a corporate defendant through an
affiliate in certain limited situations. When a basis for personal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporate parent cannot be established
based on its direct contacts with the forum state, the plaintiff will
often ask the court to impute the jurisdictionally significant
contacts of a U.S. subsidiary to the parent. In essence, this amounts
to a request that the particular court ignores the corporate
separateness (or “pierce the corporate veil”) of the parent and
subsidiary and treat them as “alter ego[s],” or one entity, for
purposes of determining personal jurisdiction.29 Generally stated,
under the alter ego analysis, “a non-resident parent corporation is
amenable to suit in the forum state if the parent company exerts so
much control over the subsidiary that the two do not exist as
separate entities but are one and the same for purposes of
jurisdiction.”30 In other words, an alter ego analysis examines the
corporate structure of and the relationship between the companies,
and usually turns on whether the parent exercises excessive
‘domination and control’ over the subsidiary. While the factors
used to make this determination vary state-by-state, the sharpest
focus tends to be on whether the subsidiary is adequately
capitalized, and whether the corporations observe corporate
formalities, and whether they avoid overlap of corporate records,
functions or personnel. Overall, affiliates should avoid the
following factors:
Commingling or mixing of funds and other assets of the
entities
The failure to segregate funds of the separate entities
The diversion of corporate funds or assets to other than
corporate uses

29 See Estate of Thomson v. Toyota Motor Corp. Worldwide, 545 F.3d 357, 362
(6th Cir. 2008) (citing courts that have endorsed the use of alter-ego theory to
establish corporate jurisdiction).
30 Id. (quoting Danton v. Innovative Gaming Corp., 246 F. Supp.2d 64, 72 (D.
Me. 2003)).
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The parent’s treatment of the assets of the subsidiary as its
own
The failure to issue stock or to obtain authority to issue
stock
The parent’s holding out that it is liable for the debts of the
subsidiary
The failure to maintain minutes or adequate corporate
records, and the confusion of the records of the separate
entities
The failure to maintain other legal formalities, such as the
holding of meetings or approval of major actions
Confusingly similar names among the entities
Identical ownership in both entities
Same directors and officers in both entities
Same individuals responsible for the supervision and
management of the day-to-day activities of both entities
The parent’s approval of the day-to-day transactions of the
subsidiary
The use of the same office or business location by both
entities
The employment of the same employees and/or attorney
by both entities
The failure to adequately capitalize the subsidiary
The absence of separate assets in the subsidiary
The use of a subsidiary as a mere shell, instrumentality or
conduit of the parent
The concealment and misrepresentation of the identity of
the responsible ownership, management and financial
interests in the entities, or the concealment of business
activities
The failure to maintain arm’s length relationships among
related entities
The use of the subsidiary to procure labor, services or
merchandise for the parent
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The diversion of assets from the subsidiary by or to the
parent
The manipulation of assets and liabilities between the
entities so as to concentrate the assets in the parent and the
liabilities in the subsidiary
The contracting by a subsidiary with a third-party with the
intent to avoid performance of the contract by use of the
subsidiary as a shield against liability
The use of the subsidiary as a subterfuge for illegal
transactions
The formation and use of a subsidiary to transfer to it the
existing liabilities of the parent
It is not necessary for all of the foregoing factors to be present
before a court will treat two companies as alter egos. Likewise, one
factor standing alone is usually insufficient. Nevertheless, the
more factors that are present, the more likely it is that a court will
exercise jurisdiction over the parent based on the relevant contacts
of a subsidiary. Moreover, as the factors demonstrate, piercing the
corporate veil is a fact-dependent inquiry, making it difficult to
accurately predict whether a court will exercise jurisdiction under
this theory in any particular case.
6.

CONCLUSION

Courts continue to apply inconsistent approaches to the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over manufacturers placing
products in the ‘stream of commerce’ despite the conservatism
expressed in Goodyear and McIntyre. Predicting consequences will
continue to prove difficult, and the Supreme Court may need to
revisit the issue.
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